the damage of reputations of foreign scholars who depended upon large fees for their livelihood.
The resolution adopted by the CAA is in the following terms:
Art historians, when consulted on such matters as scholarly attribution, can avoid the suggestion of self-interest by establishing in advance fees which bear no relation to the monetary value of any work of art in question and which do not otherwise relate to the monetary effects of any research investigation, opinion or statement by the art historian... to avoid suspicion of self-interest it is not recommended under our Code of Ethics that you set yourself a fee as a percentage of the market value of a work of art. If such is involved it seems wisest to establish the fee in advance of undertaking a project and when possible to have concurrence in writing.
In the United Kingdom the CAA Code of Ethics does not of course apply in any formal sense. However, the concerns which inspired the adoption of this resolution do apply as strongly here as in the United States of America, as became clear from the evidence of experts called in the course of the libel action. These experts, Professor Martin Kemp and Mr Baer, both considered that it would quite acceptable for an art historian to accept a fixed consultancy fee in respect of an attribution, but would under no circumstances condone the payment of a fee by way of commission on the sale price of the work of art. Professor Hartt himself was unable to establish the existence of such a practice among art historians.
The reason for such widespread solidarity on the ethics of accepting a commission such as that negotiated by Professor Hartt is clear: museums and private purchasers will place great weight upon the attribution of a work of art by an expert, and the assumption will be, unless there has been a clear statement to the contrary that the expert has acted independently and without any personal interest. If a practice of accepting such commission were to be established, this would have a serious effect upon the reputation of art historians and should not be adopted. It would, in such cases, be extremely difficult to establish objectivity on the part of the art historian, since there would always be the risk that the expert with a financial involvement would take an optimistic view in his attribution. Mrs Geraldine Norman, the third defendant and one of the authors of the disputed articles, stated in evidence that in the 1920s and 1930s there were art scholars who wrote certificates of attribution for cash and that nowadays little credence was given to such attributions by reason of the payments involved.
The newspaper article
In December 1988 The Independent newspaper published two articles, written by Mrs Geraldine Norman and Mr John Windsor, covering the story of the discovery of the statuette and the role played by Professor Hartt in its attribution to Michelangelo. Mrs Norman had encountered M. de Bry on previous occasions when other dubious discoveries of works of art had been made, and as a result, was immediately suspicious as to the real origin of the statuette.
The first article complained of appeared on the front page of The Independent and bore the heading 'Michelangelo's David suffers the slings of avarice'. The article related the story of the discovery of the statuette by M, de Bry in a friend's flat and the fact that Professor Hartt 'managed to write a whole book about it in less than a year', continuing:
He dreamed in dollars as well as aesthetics, and before the book was begun had agreed with de Bry that he should receive five per cent of the proceeds, or US $2.5m whichever was the higher.
After relating a few more details of the background to,the discovery, the article referred the reader to the second article on page 5 of the same issue of the newspaper. The top heading for this second article stated:
A small stucco model is about to rock the art world. Geraldine Norman and John Windsor report.
The article revealed the discovery, not only of the statuette itself, but also of a letter in which Professor Hartt set out the price for his expert opinion: five per cent of the sale price, and his proposal that this proportion should increase if the figure sold for iess than £20m. M. de Bry's 'flair for discoveries -including a Greek warrior's head which the Getty Museum bought from him for £2.5m, recently identified as a modern copy' -was revealed in the article, which also described other treasures belonging to M. de Bry, including Michelangelo's first sculpture and the last mirror Louis XIV looked in before he died. Commenting upon the annoucement by Professor Hartt of the discovery and the publication of his book the authors stated: 'While the sincerity of his enthusiasm is obvious, other scholars do not endorse his conclusions. ' A number of excerpts translated from the Hartt/de Bry letters were also included in the article, demonstrating the nature of the commission agreement between the two men.
The statement of claim Eight days after the publication of these articles, Professor Hartt issued a writ and on the same day a statement of claim was served. It was in these terms:
The said words in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff, motivated by avarice, had attributed a seven-inch broken statue to Michelangelo and written a book about it, thus giving his attribution a spurious authority and the statue publicity, with the intention of the statue thereafter being sold for a huge sum of money and of his receiving 5% of the sale proceeds or US $2.5m, whichever is the greater.
The defence contained a denial that the words were defamatory, but continued by setting up the defence of justification and fair comment in the alternative.
At the initial hearing of the case before Popplewell J in October 1989, counsel for the plaintiff opened by asserting that the article suggested, among other things, that Professor Hartt had been dishonest and that there was a conspiracy to which he had been party. It was held, after reference to the Court of Appeal 2 , that the allegation of a conspiracy was an amendment of the pleading which could not be permitted without granting the defendants an adjournment to consider the matter afresh. The plea of dishonesty was allowed to stand and the statement of claim was amended so as to include the words 'When he did not honestly believe that the statue was by Michelangelo'.
Innuendo
This assertion of dishonesty constituted a popular or false innuendo: at no point in the articles complained of was it specifically stated that the plaintiff had acted dishonestly, yet he argued that this was the meaning that the ordinary reader would have given to the words. The popular innuendo should be distinguished from the true or legal innuendo, which may be defined as a defamatory implication of the words which arises, not from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words, but from some meaning which would be given to the words only by those persons in possession of certain extrinsic facts which may render seemingly innocent words defamatory. The first question to be decided here was whether the words complained of were capable of bearing the popular innuendo as pleaded. The defendants pleaded that the newspaper article, as read by an ordinary intelligent reader, would not convey the message that the Professor had acted dishonestly: the allegation was merely that he had behaved in an unethical manner by accepting the commission. The defendants accepted that this allegation was itself defamatory, but claimed to be able to justify it, i.e. to prove its truth. Popplewell J in the first hearing, summed up the difference between the two contrary meanings as follows: the plaintiff asserted that the defendants were accusing him of being 'an avaricious knave', while the defendants claimed that they were saying that he had been 'an avaricious fool', and that, while this in itself may be defamatory, they had defences to it.
Were the words capable of bearing the meaning complained of? Popplewell J, on this initial point of whether the words were capable of bearing the meaning pleaded for by the plaintiff, considered that they were not. The matter was then referred to the Court of Appeal where Neill LJ described the approach which the court should take when attempting to find the meaning of words in a libel action. He cited a number of previous judicial statements on this point, including Lord Halsbury LC in Nevill v Fine Arts and General Insurance Company Ltd 2 :
It seems to me, unreasonable that when there are a number of good interpretations the only bad one should be seized upon to give a defamatory sense to the document.
A number of decisions of the House of Lord's have emphasized the fact that the lay person, when confronted with a newspaper article such as the one complained of, is likely to read between the lines, particularly where the implication is derogatory 4 . However, in Morgan v Odhams Press 5 , Lord Reid and Lord Morris, recognizing that such an approach would be capable of causing injustice to defendants, mitigated its harshness somewhat by declaring that, while the reasonable reader is not naive, he is not unduly suspicious. He should not be treated as someone who is avid for scandal or as someone who will select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available.
Counsel for the plaintiff claimed that an accusation of dishonesty could be inferred from the prominence given to the story: the first article appeared, not on the art pages, but on the front page of The Independent, thus suggesting a major scandal. In addition, it was claimed that the juxtaposition of Professor Hartt's name with those of two men against whom allegations of dishonest conduct were said to have been made, together with the assertion that he 'managed to write a whole book about [the statuette] in less than a year' would lead the reasonable reader to assume that allegations of dishonesty were being made against the plaintiff., Neill LJ rejected this contention as well as that of recklessness, i.e. that the defendants alleged that the plaintiff had made the attribution not caring whether it was true or false. The plaintiff had therefore failed to make out his case that the words complained of should be understood to mean that he had been either dishonest or reckless in making the attribution.
However, the learned judge did consider that the reasonable reader would understand these articles to mean that the plaintiff had allowed his critical judgment to be affected and influenced by the enormous sum which he would receive in return for authenticating the statue. The words 'avarice' and 'dreams of avarice' and 'terms for authenticity' and 'terms for the putative Michelangelo' all pointed towards such a meaning. In addition, points which the defendants made in their own pleadings reinforced Neill LJ's view that the allegation against the Professor was that he had failed to assess objectively the evidence as to whether the statue was the work of Michelangelo. These points related first to the negative results of tests on the statue which the plaintiff had arranged for in the hope of confirming that it had suffered fire damage at the end of the seventeenth century; proof of such damage would have provided a means of linking the statue with historic records of Michelangelo's model. Secondly, the defendants alleged, the plaintiff had discovered as a result of these tests that the model was not made of marblebased stucco as he had originally thought, but of plaster or gesso, which would have required a wholly different technique. The defendants alleged that, despite these findings, the plaintiff made only minor changes to his already written manuscript. Neill LJ therefore came to the conclusion that the defendants' own pleadings showed that the words complained of were capable of bearing the meaning that the plaintiff had not assessed objectively the evidence when making the attribution.
Neill LJ also upheld the further claim of the plaintiff that the words in the article were capable of bearing the meaning that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the plaintiff had been dishonest or reckless in attributing the statue to Michelangelo and in thereafter writing a book about the attribution.
Such a claim is of course different from an assertion that the words could be read as implying an allegation of actual dishonesty or actual recklessness.
The finding of the Court of Appeal
In summary, the Court of Appeal held that the two articles in respect of which Professor Hartt claimed damages for libel were capable of having and did in fact have two defamatory meanings: a) that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the plaintiff had been dishonest or reckless in attributing the statuette to Michelangelo and thereafter writing a book about the attribution. b) that, in making the attribution and writing the book, the plaintiff had not assessed objectively the evidence as to whether or not the statuette was by Michelangelo. The matter then proceeded to trial on the substantive issues in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court before Morland J.
The trial of the action
In the High Court the defendants relied on the defence of justification, i.e. they asserted that the articles were true in substance and in fact. In addition and in the alternative, they asserted that the articles were fair comment on a matter of public interest, namely the plaintiffs public claim that the statuette was by Michelangelo. The plaintiff argued that the defence of fair comment was not available to the defendants in this case since they were actuated by malice.
The defence of justification
In establishing a defence of justification, the defendant in a libel action is entitled to rely not only on facts of which he was aware at the time of publication, but also on facts which may have come to his notice subsequently. This may be seen as in the interests of justice since the essence of the defence is that the words complained of were true: if that is indeed the case, the defendant should not be hampered in his defence by being restricted to bringing evidence of those facts of which he was aware at the time of publication. It is the truth of the statements, rather than the defendant's motive in making them, which is relevant where justification is pleaded.
Similarly, the plaintiff, in attempting to refute the allegations, is entitled to adduce evidence of matters which were not within the defendant's knowledge at the time of writing the article. Again, the issue is the truth or otherwise of the statements complained of rather than the state of mind of the defendants in writing them. The plaintiff was therefore permitted to put before the court the detailed notes which he made at the time of his examination' of the statuette in order to show objectivity and that he had reasonable grounds for believing it to be by Michelangelo.
Morland J found that the defendants had succeeded in establishing the defence of justification in relation to much of the content of the two articles, notably with regard to the following matters: (i) that actuated by desire for an enormous sum of money, the plaintiff broke the general custom and ethics of his profession by obtaining for himself a financial interest in the sale price of a work of art whose value depends primarily on his attribution; (ii) he lent the authority of his reputation to the statuette, while wrongfully concealing his financial interest in it, and making statements he knew to be false about the circumstances in which he first saw it; (iii) he thus sacrificed his scholarly objectivity for financial gain, by exposing himself to an acute conflict of interest which has deprived his honest opinion of the weight and respect it would otherwise have deserved. However, Morland J found that the two defamatory meanings established by the Court of Appeal were not justified by the defend-ants and it was therefore necessary to determine whether or not the defence of fair comment was available in respect of these remaining statements.
The defence of fair comment
The defence of fair comment may be available in order to protect comment and criticism on matters of public interest. In the present case, the plaintiffs attribution of the statue was clearly a matter of public interest: in the words of Morland J:
The concealment of a huge sum of money relating to a percentage on the sale price of the statuette was a matter that needed to be brought into the public domain.
In the case of fair comment however, unlike the defence of justification, the defendant's state of mind will be relevant and the defence will not be available where the making of the comment was actuated by malice. The defendants asserted that the statements complained of constituted comment on a particular set of facts; the plaintiffs denied that the statements were capable of being regarded as comment and moreover claimed that the defendants were actuated by malice.
Morland J stated that for the defence of'fair comment' to be available the alleged comment has to be recognizable as such by the type of reader to whom the article is addressed: in this case the average ordinary reader of The Independent, who would be expected to be reasonably intelligent, educated and informed on artistic matters. It is not necessary, in order to plead the defence, for the author to state specifically 'in my opinion' or 'I consider', as long as the statement is reasonably seen to be comment. This will not be the case where the 'comment' is so mixed up with the facts that the reader cannot distinguish between what is report and what is comment.
In the present case the learned judge held that, while the statements were capable of amounting to comment, the articles in question constituted sensational journalism. Consequently 6 , the defence of fair comment could not apply because of the difficulty of achieving sensations and still effecting a clear separation of the facts from the defamatory expressions of opinion.
Morland J then proceeded to consider the question of whether or not the defendants had been actuated by malice. In his opinion, Mrs Norman 'did allow herself to be carried away by her enthusiasm for a scoop' but the story was a 'sensational' one and proper checks were carried out with regard to all aspects of the story. In this context the realities of commercial journalism must be taken into account: it is acceptable for an enthusiastic investigative journalist, if all proper verifications as to correctness of sources have been made, to choose to 'angle' the story so as to portray a particular figure in a story in a more favourable light where that person may be in a position to release further sensational stories for publication. Moreover, the fact that Mrs Norman telephoned Professor Hartt for his reaction to the story only a few hours before The Independent went to press was not relevant as, according to the judge, even if approached several days beforehand, the Professor would still have been reluctant to make any statement. Thus, after careful consideration of all. the relevant aspects of the case, it was clear that Mrs Norman had acted as a responsible journalist in search of an important and sensational story and had not been-actuated by malice.
Damages
Morland J stressed that there are two elements in the assessment of damages for libel: the first is the vindication of the plaintiff to the public and the second is the consolation to the plaintiff for the wrong done by the defamation. The 'public' which should be considered in the 'vindication' element of the damages includes the readers of The Independent and the world of art historians, art dealers and museum curators.
The two defamatory meanings which were not justified (relating to the plaintiffs lack of objectivity in making the attribution and to the question of whether there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the plaintiff had been dishonest or reckless in his attribution) damaged the Professor 'in his reputation, not only in his professional capacity as a scholar but also in his personal character.' The accusations that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that he had dishonestly and recklessly attributed the statuette to Michelangelo and that he lacked objectivity would normally have attracted a substantial award of damages. However, in view of the matters which had in fact been proved in relation to the Professor's conduct in this matter, it was necessary to effect a substantial reduction in the damages which would otherwise have been awarded. The damages would not, however, be negatived altogether since there is a clear distinction between a gross breach of professional ethics and an attack on the Professor as a man and a scholar in the honesty of his attribution. As such the award of damages was reduced to just £7500: a small sum indeed when read in the light of awards of damages in other recent successful defamation actions. 
